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In recent years, there has been a sea change in measuring social impact in both the philanthropic sector and the double bottom line 
investing community. However, while many methodologies exist, there is minimal consensus 
across the sector on how to assess social impact. 
On March 26, 2003, The Goldman Sachs Foundation and The Rockefeller Foundation 
hosted over fi fty funders at Goldman Sachs offi ces in New York to discuss the issues sur-
rounding assessing social impact and social return on investment (“SROI”). We were pleased 
with the high level of interest in this topic and the insights articulated during the day’s discus-
sions. Our focus was on two thematic fi elds: education/youth development and community 
development/employment.
The purpose of the meeting was twofold: 
•  To convene a cross-section of charitable and double bottom line funders to discuss 
and learn from various approaches to assessing social impact and social return on 
investment in both the nonprofi t and for-profi t sectors; and 
•  To begin a dialogue on developing a common set of expectations for metrics or 
standards that could be used in the education/youth development and community 
development/employment sectors to assess the social impact of philanthropic and 
other social purpose investments.
The idea for this meeting came from our respective activities in the area of social impact 
assessment. The Rockefeller Foundation recently commissioned work by leading academics 
and social scientists in the area of social impact and SROI assessment. The Goldman Sachs 
Foundation has supported work through the Global Social Venture Competition on social 
impact measurement, and convened a symposium for social entrepreneurs on measuring 
social impact in 2002 at the University of California at Berkeley. 
While the attached document by Neil Carlson summarizes the content of the March 26th 
meeting, it should not be viewed as a stand-alone publication. We intended this discussion to 
serve as a catalyst for furthering dialogue among funders. This meeting was only the start of a 
journey toward developing metrics that can be useful to the funding 
community and practitioners. 
Finally, special thanks to Catherine Clark of Columbia Business School, William Rosenzweig 
of the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley and Sara Olsen of SVT Consulting for orga-
nizing this meeting.
Sincerely,
Stephanie Bell-Rose Julia Lopez
President Senior Vice President
The Goldman Sachs Foundation The Rockefeller Foundation 
21. Background
Over the past decade, a new consensus has emerged around the 
importance of building administrative and operational capacity among 
mission-driven organizations. Blending management principles from 
the for-profi t world with social values of the nonprofi t sector, a van-
guard of social entrepreneurs and nonprofi t managers has created 
a new generation of nonprofi t organizations, socially responsible 
businesses, and social-purpose enterprises that balances scale with 
quality, fi nancial stability with social impact, and community ties with 
rapid growth. Meanwhile, a new generation of philanthropists and so-
cial investors has created strategic investment tools and grantmaking 
strategies that focus on improving the administrative and operational 
capacity of mission-driven organizations. As the conceptual boundar-
ies that once separated nonprofi ts from for-profi ts, investment from 
philanthropy, and social returns from fi nancial returns have become 
more permeable, there has been a marked shift in the way people 
think about the relationship among capital, philanthropy, management, 
and strategy. 
Nowhere has this change been more profound than in the fi eld of 
grantmaking. The past decade has witnessed a marked shift from 
project-related grantmaking toward venture-type philanthropic invest-
ment characterized by more capacity-building grants, higher levels of 
engagement by grantmakers, and heightened emphasis on measure-
ment and results. Investors are now insisting on greater transparency 
and accountability. They want to understand the impact that their 
dollars are having on the world. 
The new interest in accountability and impact has brought measure-
ment and evaluation into sharp relief. While the fi eld has evolved, 
funders and social purpose investors still wrestle with the most 
fundamental of questions: How do they know that their grants and 
investments are achieving desired results?
The fi eld has yet to establish a common understanding of “social 
impact” —what it is or how to measure it. Currently, measures of im-
pact vary from funder to funder, and organization to organization. The 
more sophisticated measurement tools integrate organizational and 
process metrics with quantifi able outcome data, but in the absence of 
a common measure (like shareholder value) investors and grantmakers 
are making it up as they go along. 
3On March 26, 2003, The Goldman Sachs Foundation and the Rockefell-
er Foundation convened leading foundation executives and investors 
in businesses with social missions at Goldman Sachs in New York 
to discuss social impact assessment (“SIA”) in two fi elds: (1) youth 
development/education, and (2) workforce development/community 
development. The meeting goals were: 
•  To explore language barriers, current best practices, opportuni-
ties, and challenges in social impact assessment.
•  To defi ne activities participants might undertake to reduce SIA 
misalignments between funders and nonprofi ts. 
•  To discuss interest in collaborative SIA efforts among funders 
and nonprofi ts. 
The meeting featured 51 participants from 31 institutions representing 
community development fi nancial institutions, foundations, and fund-
ing intermediaries. In addition to the 43 participants who had gathered 
in New York, eight participants joined via videoconference from San 
Francisco and Chicago.
Catherine Clark of Columbia Business School, co-director of Rockefell-
er’s Double Bottom Line Project, provided the conceptual framework 
with an overview of existing social impact assessment models.1 Repre-
sentatives from four organizations—the Roberts Enterprise Develop-
ment Fund, New Profi t, Inc., the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, 
and Coastal Enterprises, Inc.—presented case studies of their ongoing 
impact assessment work. Participants broke into working groups to 
discuss specifi c strategies and outline next steps in the fi elds of youth 
development/education and workforce development/community devel-
opment. This paper synthesizes the meeting’s discussions and offers 
some conclusions and next steps for advancing the fi eld.
1.  The Rockefeller Foundation Provenex Fund Double Bottom Line Project team consists 
of: Catherine Clark of Columbia Business School, William Rosenzweig of the Haas 
School of Business at UC Berkeley, David Long of Abt Associates, and Sara Olsen of SVT 
Consulting.  This team has worked closely with the Foundation’s Laura Callanan, Jac-
queline Khor, and Julia Lopez, members of the Provenex Committee, and entrepreneurs 
in the Fund’s portfolio.
42. State of the Field
The timing of this discussion is especially relevant. Over a decade 
has passed since the Roberts Enterprise Development Fund fi rst 
began tinkering with the idea of blended social and fi nancial returns. 
It has been six years since Christine Letts, William P. Ryan, and Allen 
Grossman published “Virtuous Capital: What Foundations Can Learn 
from Venture Capitalists” in Harvard Business Review, igniting both 
controversy and deep interest throughout the fi elds of nonprofi t man-
agement, philanthropy, and social investing. 
So after a decade, where does the fi eld stand vis-à-vis measuring 
social impact?
The good news is that the fi eld has developed a rich set of conceptual 
frameworks, analytical tools, and management strategies over the 
past few years. Several individual organizations have brought new 
levels of rigor to their work with grantees, contributing depth and 
breadth to a diverse and growing fi eld. In framing remarks, Clark 
compared sixteen different models used to assess the social impact 
of investments in double bottom line businesses and nonprofi t orga-
nizations. The table below depicts the Double Bottom Line Project 
team’s view of how these assessment methods relate to one another 
in terms of three variables: the type of venture to which the method 
is most suited (nonprofi t or for-profi t); the investment stage, to which 
the method is most suitably applied (early stage or mature); and the 
functional content (measuring outcomes, managing organizational 
processes, or gauging the level of social responsibility).
Sixteen Social Impact Assessment Methods Currently Used in the 
Nonprofi t and For-Profi t Sectors
Yet the social enterprise fi eld as a whole fi nds itself burdened by 
signifi cant misalignments in goals, methodologies, and strategy. 
Funders have different theories of change, goals, metrics, and report-
ing requirements—sometimes tangential to and sometimes at odds 
with other funders. Grantees have their own theories of change and 
management priorities, and frequently fi nd themselves burdened by 
funders’ demands and the exigencies of day-to-day management. 
For 
Profi t
Non profi t
Spectrum of Methods
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Social
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Process
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© Copyright 2003, Double Bottom Line Project: Clark, Rosenzweig, Long, and Olsen.
5The fi eld as a whole lacks common vocabulary.2 Clark highlighted 
common reactions social entrepreneurs and investors have to this 
complexity and inconsistency:
In aggregate, these comments underscore four overlapping groups of 
challenges the fi eld must grapple with as it seeks to improve measure-
ment practices and deepen its social impact. 
Conceptual
•  How does the fi eld defi ne a set of commonly shared 
desirable outcomes, and how will it measure them? 
What are best practices? 
•  How can the fi eld create the rigor necessary to achieve 
proven—rather than anecdotal or apparent—outcomes? 
•  Is there a set of general principles that might constitute a 
sturdy foundation upon which organizations with slightly 
different theories of change might build? 
Operational
•  What management tools and evaluation systems need to be 
developed (or adopted more broadly) to support measurement, 
assessment, and reporting? 
“Individual constituencies require different measures, reducing 
operational effi ciency as I produce different reports for each 
constituent, funder, or regulator.”
“It’s hard to learn what works if you can’t read data, see consis-
tent trends, or learn lessons within one project or across different 
grantees/investees.”
“If you’re not using impact tools familiar to peer foundations or 
investors, it’s hard to leverage your own capital or mitigate risks 
by bringing in co-investors—while this is often exactly what is 
needed to build robust impacts.”
“I’m in funding shock. After meeting or exceeding performance 
measures, why isn’t further funding by my current funders or 
others more easily obtained?”
“It’s very expensive to track outcomes consistently, and without 
a commitment from other funders to value the results, is this a 
good use of funds?”
Social entrepreneurs say:
Grantmakers and investors say:
2. See “Double Bottom Line Glossary,” (Appendix A).
“My reporting needs and my funders’ needs don’t 
always align. What the funder needs from me may not 
be what I need to manage my venture more effectively.” 
6•  How do organizations balance the credibility of impact as-
sessment with its feasibility, given the fact that assessment 
methods that prove impact are typically very costly, and hence 
less feasible?
Structural
•  Given the diversity of approaches and goals among funders, 
not to mention the diffi culty of comparing metrics across 
fi elds of practice (such as workforce development/community 
development or youth development/education), what practi-
cal solutions might there be to achieve scale and preserve 
autonomy? 
•  What happens when funders themselves bring unclear goals 
or unrealistic expectations to the funding process?
•  How do grantees balance competing priorities and demands 
among their various funders?
Practical
•  Will funders really follow through? Will nonprofi t boards buy 
into the process? 
•  Can the fi eld realistically expect to achieve scale given its 
fragmentation and inertia? 
•  How do the capital needs of potential investees match up 
against the resources of investors and grantees?
73. Case Studies
How do these issues play out at an organizational level? How have 
different organizations grappled with social impact assessment, and 
what do their experiences say about the current status and future 
of the fi eld as a whole? To get inside these questions, participants 
examined case studies from three leading grantmakers and a grantee. 
Taken together, these case studies provided a basis for drilling down 
into the specifi c challenges facing the fi eld as a whole. 
3.1.  Roberts Enterprise Development Fund: 
From Measurement to Management
A leader in the fi eld of social enterprise, the Roberts Enterprise 
Development Fund (REDF) is widely acknowledged as a pioneer 
in performance measurement. REDF practices engaged philanthropy 
with a closed portfolio of nonprofi t organizations, offering each 
fi nancial and management support for as long as they meet agreed-
upon performance standards. Most of REDF’s early investments were 
in social purpose enterprises, typically a specifi c business managed 
under the aegis of a nonprofi t organization, and REDF’s assessment 
work focused on measuring the social and fi nancial outcomes of those 
enterprises. These SROI analyses stimulated a great deal of discussion 
about investment-oriented performance assessment when they were 
published three years ago, but they did little to inform management 
practice. REDF has since developed a comprehensive outcomes-track-
ing system called OASIS, which helps nonprofi t managers measure 
and track outcomes in the social purpose enterprise and across the 
entire organization. 
REDF’s Social Impact Assessment Efforts Address Four Perspectives
REDF Approaches to Measuring Impact
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8REDF and its portfolio nonprofi ts started building OASIS in 1998. The 
effort involved a two- to three-year planning process for each of four 
portfolio organizations that implemented it. Technologically, OASIS 
uses hierarchical linear modeling, a new statistical process that uses 
embedded data to connect outcomes to specifi c interventions. Practi-
cally, the system has allowed organizations to reengineer their service 
delivery models and has transformed how information is tracked, ana-
lyzed, and reported. The result, says Melinda Tuan, REDF’s Managing 
Director, is an internet-enabled relational database system (see below) 
that managers can use for ongoing management and performance 
benchmarking. Instead of just measuring outcomes after the fact, 
OASIS helps managers benchmark and improve performance in day-
to-day operations—a crucial advancement. OASIS does not yet include 
fi nancial information but REDF plans eventually to combine the fi nan-
cial aspects of what the whole agency is doing with the social data.
Screen Shot of REDF Portfolio Company MIS System, OASIS (the 
Rubicon Programs Inc. System-CICERO)
 More strategically, OASIS offers portfolio organizations a potentially 
useful operational tool to mitigate the structural barriers they face 
in managing diverse sources of funding and juggling reporting 
requirements—a signifi cant structural hurdle many social enterprises 
face. By way of example, Tuan pointed to Rubicon, one of REDF’s 
star organizations, which has 80 different funders. Prior to OASIS 
(which Rubicon customized as CICERO), staff collected client informa-
tion on paper and stored the information in different fi les throughout 
the agency. Reporting to 80 different funders was challenging and 
time-consuming under the paper-based systems, Tuan noted. The 
electronic system, on the other hand, streamlines data gathering, sim-
plifi es reporting, and allows the organization to deliver services with 
consistent quality. One of REDF’s portfolio organizations went from 
using 140 different data collection forms down to 36, a 300 percent 
reduction in paperwork.
9According to Tuan: 
•  Systematic outcome measurement requires a huge cultural 
buy-in process. “In 1998, very few of our portfolio companies 
were interested in the level of analysis we wanted,” Tuan said. 
But their interest has grown over the course of their long-term 
partnership with REDF. “If you give them a little bit, there is a 
huge appetite for data.”
•  A consistent expectation of reliable outcome assessment 
is essential. Funders may have to adjust their expectations, 
Tuan warned, acknowledging the possibility that past data-
gathering systems may not be reliable. For example, Tuan said, 
if funders expect an employment rate of 80 percent, and the 
grantee delivers only 64 percent, it may not be because the 
organization isn’t hitting its numbers, but rather because the 
historical data is infl ated. Until there are reliable standards for 
data in this fi eld, funders will ask for, and continue to receive, 
infl ated numbers.
3.2. New Profi t, Inc.: Finding the Right Measures
New Profi t, Inc. (NPI) uses the Balanced Scorecard, a method of 
measuring and managing ongoing social and fi nancial value-creation. 
Originally developed by Robert Kaplan and Edward Norton for corpora-
tions, NPI has tailored the Balanced Scorecard for use in its portfolio 
organizations. As an intermediary funding organization with 43 direct 
investors, NPI practices engaged philanthropy, helping a limited num-
ber of portfolio organizations grow to scale over a three- to fi ve-year 
time horizon. NPI is in its fourth year of performance assessment 
work, and it reports quarterly to its investors.
NPI’s philosophy is that the greatest leverage point in the nonprofi t 
sector lies in growing high-performing nonprofi ts to scale. No one at 
New Profi t had ever engaged in grantmaking prior to working at NPI, 
but staff members brought other investment and nonprofi t manage-
ment experience to the organization. Informed by these diverse back-
grounds, milestones and deliverables drive NPI’s work.
From the start, NPI’s social impact assessment goal was to develop 
a tool that could look holistically across the organization, build mea-
sures, and identify the gaps between a grantee’s mission/values 
and its operational plan. Annual Balanced Scorecard reports refl ect 
three overall areas: growth—measured by compound annual growth 
rates, revenues, and numbers served; quality—a bundle of various im-
provement benchmarks; and leverage—metrics that gauge how well 
grantees leverage outside resources. The Balanced Scorecard system, 
said NPI Managing Partner and co-founder Kelly Fitzsimmons, empha-
sizes the “connective tissue between the game plan and ‘what does it 
mean for what I do today and how I execute against that plan?’” NPI, 
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Fitzsimmons noted, spends “a lot of time looking at lead measures and 
lag measures. These let us know what we see in front of us as well as 
what came behind.”
According to Fitzsimmons: 
•  The Balanced Scorecard must be preceded by theories of 
change to succeed. Without a strong theory of change in 
place, neither organizations nor funders know what they need 
to measure in the Balanced Scorecard. 
•  Sometimes there is a confl ict between performance and 
funding. NPI grantees often confront a deeper structural fl aw 
in the nonprofi t capital market—that high-performing organi-
zations are often implicitly punished for their success. “We’ve 
noticed something counterintuitive, [which is] that perfor-
mance is a bad thing,” Fitzsimmons said. Instead of reward-
ing high-growth, high performance, and fi nancial solvency, 
funders often view these organizations as “too successful” or 
insuffi ciently needy. 
•  It is important to keep in mind what the sources of “organ 
rejection” might be. Other funders or an organization’s 
board may not be ready for a performance tracking system. 
Unless this practical consideration is addressed—and there 
is broad buy-in—the performance measurement system will 
break down.
•  Board development is an unanticipated benefi t of mile-
stone- and deliverables-driven social impact assessments. 
Fitzsimmons noted that performance measurement can be a 
strong catalyst of change: “Once a plan has been clarifi ed and 
performance milestones set, the onus is on the board.”
3.3.  Edna McConnell Clark Foundation: 
Improving the Rigor of Impact Assessment
The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation (EMCF), under the leader-
ship of Michael Bailin, has evolved from a traditional foundation to an 
organization practicing high-engagement philanthropy. Beginning in 
1999, the foundation trimmed its portfolio from 182 grants in 1998 to 53 
grants in 2002, increasing grant values and making multi-year com-
mitments. With the help of a nonprofi t management consulting fi rm, 
EMCF fundamentally changed its staffi ng model to hire organizational 
development and knowledge development specialists rather than 
program offi cers. The foundation now focuses on one issue—youth 
development—and directs the majority of its funding to organizations 
in the northeast corridor from Washington D.C. to New York.
Throughout this transformation, EMCF has integrated social impact 
assessment into both funding decisions and everyday evaluation. In 
the selection process, foundation portfolio managers conduct exten-
sive due diligence on potential grantees, assessing their ability to help 
clients realize improvements in four core outcomes areas: educational 
skills attainment; successful transition to self-sustaining work; civic 
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engagement; and avoidance of high-risk behaviors that derail youth. 
The foundation selects grantees on the basis of their ability to deliver, 
grow, and sustain impact. Using 70 indicators across six evaluation 
areas, EMCF staff believe that their due diligence process has brought 
new rigor and sophistication to the foundation’s grantmaking. Once 
organizations are awarded a grant, they develop a plan that includes a 
combination of fi nancial, growth, and outcomes benchmarks. Depend-
ing upon the population the organization is serving, the Clark model 
can take one to two years to implement.
According to David Hunter, director of evaluation and knowledge 
development, helping grantees move from “apparent” effectiveness to 
“proven” effectiveness is at the heart of the foundation’s investment 
and growth strategy. The foundation has identifi ed key quality indica-
tors based on existing research, which it uses in performance planning 
and assessment (see www.emcf.org). EMCF does not use proxy data 
to link outputs to outcomes but focuses instead on ensuring that grant-
ees meet their milestones. The goal, Hunter said, is to help grantees 
move through three levels of knowledge about program effectiveness:
•  Apparent effectiveness: through a systematic effort to collect 
outcome data.
•  Demonstrated effectiveness: via systematic comparisons.
•  Proven effectiveness: through experimental research design.
“We don’t ask grantees to report on process,” Hunter said. “We 
care about whether they’re hitting the business plan milestones, 
the absolutely necessary things that must happen if the goal is to 
be accomplished.” The foundation, Hunter continued, believes that 
“anything that doesn’t let you say the organization is on track, will 
succeed in achieving its outcomes on its own terms, and will improve 
the quality of its outcomes, isn’t worth tracking.”
According to Hunter:
•  All business plans must have a theory of change to be 
successful. Like Fitzsimmons, Hunter was adamant about 
the importance of theories of change. “A business plan is a 
means of achieving an end. A theory of change articulates 
what that end is. It informs the creation of business plan 
milestones.”
•  The business plan must include capacity-building within 
the organization. Simply put, organizations need fi nancial and 
management support to create these changes. 
•  Funders must consider grantee participation when 
designing impact assessment systems. “If grantees don’t 
participate in designing the reporting system, they’re not 
going to benefi t,” Hunter said.
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3.4. Coastal Enterprises, Inc.: Balancing Credibility and Feasibility
One of the nation’s best-known community development fi nancial in-
stitutions, Coastal Enterprises, Inc. (CEI), manages a loan fund that 
lends money to nonprofi ts that help low-income individuals fi nd jobs. 
Over the past decade, CEI has conducted both SROI analyses and lon-
gitudinal studies of the organization’s impact. The execution of these 
studies, and the subsequent reception the fi ndings received from 
Coastal Enterprises’ funders, underscore the operational and struc-
tural challenges many organizations face in assessing social impact. 
In 1993, the Ford Foundation funded Coastal Enterprises’ fi rst SROI 
analysis. Using a cost-benefi t analysis, the study examined the 
relationship between public tax benefi ts and performance of the 
organization’s loans. The evaluation provided a foundation upon 
which the organization conducted a rigorous evaluation of its theory 
of change. “We wanted a set of measures we could use in-house to 
measure things that were important to us and our funders,” said Carla 
Dickstein, Senior Program Offi cer for Research and Policy Develop-
ment at Coastal. Using indicators from the original SROI study, Coastal 
Enterprises began conducting biennial impact studies. After gathering 
the data this way themselves for several years, they hired Rob Hollister, 
a benefi t-cost researcher from Swarthmore College. Under Hollister’s 
guidance, the organization developed a four-year study in which it used 
surveys to track individual participants over 18 months.
The recently published Low-Income Longitudinal Study confi rmed 
many assumptions but also unearthed new fi ndings. “Our original 
theory of change was that people with low incomes lacked neces-
sary networks and skills to get high-quality jobs, and nonprofi ts need 
resources to help them do it,” Dickstein said. The second part of the 
theory was that because CEI screened for the best companies and pro-
vided workers with better entry opportunities, clients would be more 
likely to stay with their jobs. While the study found that jobs sponsored 
by Coastal Enterprises appeared, on the whole, to be of higher-qual-
ity, people didn’t necessarily stay at those jobs. “They were going on 
to worse-quality jobs. So in the second round of surveys we asked, 
‘Why did you leave, what were the issues?’” Clients responded that 
workplace adjustments (work expectations, relationships with bosses 
and co-workers), along with basic life-management issues (budgeting, 
childcare, transportation), often caused people to leave.
The longitudinal study has had two principal benefi ts. First, it enabled 
Coastal Enterprises to improve the precision of its theory of change, 
helping the organization improve the quality of its services and achieve 
better outcomes. Equally important, however, was the effect it had on 
the organization’s culture. In addition to informing practice, Dickstein 
said the culture of measurement it instilled has been professionally 
rewarding to the staff.
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According to Dickstein: 
•  Tracking and publishing results requires leadership. “We 
knew we were taking some risks,” Dickstein said. “We had to 
publish the data, but what were we going to do if we didn’t like 
these results?” Because Coastal Enterprises’ chief executive 
led the impact assessment efforts, the organization developed 
what Dickstein called “a conscience internally in the R&D 
department.” 
•  Measuring impact accurately may require surveys of 
individuals in some cases. Without tracking the individual, 
Dickstein said, “We couldn’t answer the most important 
question we had at CEI: What was the impact in terms of what 
we’re doing for low-income people?”
•  Drawing on social science metrics in assessment may be 
costly. The assessment cost $500,000. “The jury is still out on 
whether we would do it again, but it has had a lot to do with 
[growing] our internal culture of learning,” Dickstein said. “It 
has been promising from that point of view.”
14
4.  Specifi c Challenges for the Field of 
Social Impact Assessment
Identifying and addressing the specifi c challenges facing the fi eld is 
not an easy task. Yet there is much to be optimistic about. According 
to recent research from the Rockefeller/Provenex Fund Double Bot-
tom Line Project, the social investment fi eld—defi ned as early-stage 
double bottom line venture capital funds, socially responsible mutual 
funds, and high-engagement grantmakers—has a total capitalization 
of at least $65.7 billion. If even a small portion of these assets were 
marshaled and invested strategically, the potential impact for advanc-
ing the fi eld and increasing social returns could be signifi cant.
Using the case studies as a springboard for conversation, meeting 
participants spent the afternoon discussing the conceptual, opera-
tional, structural, and practical challenges facing the fi eld.
Conceptual
Best practices are not standardized. Unless nonprofi ts and inves-
tors reach broad agreement about what kind of goals they are seeking, 
measures of success, and basic tools for achieving success, resources 
will continue to be allocated ineffi ciently. 
Theories of change need to be aligned among grantors, 
investors, and nonprofi ts. As the case studies demonstrated, 
measurement and social impact assessment begin with a clear focus 
on what the organization is attempting to accomplish, or its “theory of 
change.” Without that, it is diffi cult to know what to measure. 
Operational
Value cannot always be measured. The paradox of measurement 
is that value cannot always be easily measured, much less readily 
quantifi ed. As one participant noted, “By trying to defi ne results down 
to a set of metrics, you’re missing the real value of the ventures.” The 
challenge here is to fi ll out the “value picture” of an enterprise as fully 
as possible. 
Quality implementation is essential. If measurement is going to be 
worthwhile, it must be practical, technically sound, and useful. Unless 
an assessment fulfi lls all three criteria, it may not be worthwhile.
Third parties can help to achieve more technically sound data 
collection. To the extent that they involve people with evaluation skills, 
third-party evaluations tend to be clearer, more accurate, and more 
revealing than those conducted by untrained staff. They are, however, 
often expensive to undertake.
Time horizons for output and outcome measurement are long. 
Most funders are involved with a given organization for a few years 
at most, yet results may take decades to realize. This disjuncture might 
be resolved by establishing clear short-term benchmarks or longer 
engagements. 
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Structural
Signifi cant diversity exists within each fi eld. Youth development, 
economic development, education—all of these social investment 
fi elds have subfi elds that call for appropriate metrics. It is challenging 
to identify common metrics that can be used across categories and 
within subcategories.
Reporting requirements are usually not aligned. As the REDF 
case study underscored, managing each funder’s individual reporting 
requirements can be onerous for nonprofi ts. REDF’s Melinda Tuan 
noted, for example, that two REDF grantees stopped seeking govern-
ment funding because the paperwork burden was too great. 
Practical
Goals are often unclear. In some cases, funders themselves lack a 
clear theory of change, and therefore lack clear goals. A funder’s lack 
of clarity often has a trickle-down effect on grantees, who scramble to 
accommodate the funder’s shifting priorities. Likewise, impact cannot 
be measured without clear goals. 
Inconsistent funding priorities. One of the deepest structural fl aws 
in the nonprofi t capital market is the tendency for funders to spread 
their money across a community, even though many organizations 
have not demonstrated results. Consequently, “best of breed” organi-
zations often fi nd themselves scrambling for capital as funders look 
for projects that fulfi ll a particular grantmaking criterion instead of 
funding results.
Trust and mutuality are limited. Unless grantees have ownership 
over assessment tools, processes, and outcomes, they will not buy into 
the process. Impact assessment must be built on a foundation of trust 
and shared risk, or else funders will likely continue what Jed Emerson, 
senior fellow with the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, calls the 
“dance of deceit” between them and their grantees.
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5. Next Steps: Principles and Possibilities
The Social Impact Assessment meeting made one thing abundantly 
clear—there is tremendous interest in advancing the fi eld of assessing 
social impact.  A handful of principles and possibilities, participants 
determined, should guide work in each of the four areas: 
Conceptual
Principles: Funders and grantees should align goals, assessment tools, 
and best practices. 
Possibilities: 
•  Publicize what exists already. This goal could be advanced by 
developing a map of the fi eld, showing funders categorized 
by a few key indicators such as size, geography, and current 
impact assessment practice.
•  Convene follow-up meetings with a set of funders who share 
missions and goals. Funders with common interests are more 
likely to arrive at a set of common metrics or performance 
standards.
•  Develop a set of case studies on social impact assessment 
to facilitate discussion.
•  Draft a set of proposed standards to which participants 
can respond.
Operational
Principles: Grantees and investors should acknowledge evaluation 
expenses as part of the cost of doing business where appropriate, 
invest in measurement systems and tools, and develop examples of 
proven impact.
Possibilities:
•  Develop assessment tools for organizations with limited 
resources.
•  Create and publicize a workbook of defi nitions and 
operational approaches that demonstrate how those defi ni-
tions are applied.
•  Promulgate examples of best practices by subcategories 
of the fi eld.
•  Develop a list of high-quality vendors or consulting 
resources to help organizations with social impact 
assessment.
Structural
Principles: Striving to balance breadth with consistency, each fi eld and 
subfi eld should explore a range of possible outcome goals and best 
practices for measurement.
Possibilities:
•  Where possible, collaborate with co-investors to align reporting 
and assessment requirements.
•  Work to streamline onerous government reporting 
requirements.
•  Seek new sources of fl exible capital that correspond to the 
different stages and different capital needs of high-performing 
nonprofi t organizations. 
Practical
Principles: A commitment to outcomes assessment can be a 
fundamental part of the management structure and organizational 
culture among funders and nonprofi ts alike.
Possibilities:
•  Ensure grantees are deeply involved in the development and 
management of outcomes assessment strategies. 
•  Develop and promulgate best practices of how investors can 
help grantees build assessment systems and supportive 
institutional cultures.
The Rockefeller Foundation and The Goldman Sachs Foundation called 
this meeting in the hopes of jump-starting further discussion about 
social impact assessment. But the real work is just getting started. 
Several nonprofi t organizations and grantmakers in the fi elds of com-
munity and youth development are assessing the potential of a com-
monly used set of social impact measures. There is much more to be 
explored and the opportunity exists for funders to support this process 
in many different but useful ways. 
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APPENDIX A: Double Bottom Line Glossary
Credibility The extent to which the desired approach will be suffi -
ciently rigorous and thorough to provide measures that are credible to 
the social science, academic, and public policy communities.
Feasibility The extent to which measurement tools will be useful and 
applicable in the strenuous environment of a growing venture. The 
DBLP Methods Catalog defi nes feasibility in terms of fi nancial costs, 
person hours, and cultural compatibility with measurement.
Impact The difference between the outcome for a sample exposed to 
an enterprise’s activities and the outcome that would have occurred 
without the intervention (i.e., venture, organization, or investment). 
The Impact Value Chain
Impact = Measure of Change
Outcome Specifi c changes in attitudes, behaviors, knowledge, skills, 
status, or level of functioning that result from enterprise activities, 
such as fi nding a job, avoiding getting sick, or reducing emissions by a 
certain amount. 
Output Measurable results from an organization’s activities, e.g., units 
of housing, number of people placed into employment, number of 
youth served, etc.
Social Impact Assessment (SIA) Using any of the tools of social 
science, program evaluation, or business practice to determine the 
social outputs, outcomes, or impact of an intervention, program, 
organization, or company. 
Social Return The monetized impact, minus costs, of an intervention, 
program, organization, or company.
Social Return on Investment (SROI) The ratio of social returns 
to investment, calculated according to the specifi c methodology 
used by organizations such as the Roberts Enterprise Development 
Fund (REDF), the Global Social Venture Competition (GSVC), or by 
economists. This includes monetizing predicted future outputs and 
sometimes outcomes.
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Theory of Change The understanding by stakeholders of exactly 
how an enterprise will generate social impacts. It highlights the causal 
relationship between actions, short-term outcomes, and long-term 
outcomes. Another term for this is “logic model.”
Source: Rockefeller Foundation Double Bottom Line Project
